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The definition of episodic memory, as proposed by Tulving, includes a requirement
of conscious recall. As we are unable to assess this aspect of memory in non-human
animals, many researchers have referred to demonstrations of what would otherwise
be considered episodic memory as “episodic-like memory.” Here the definition of
episodic memory is re-considered based on objective criteria. While the primary focus
of this re-evaluation is based on work with non-human animals, considerations are
also drawn from converging evidence from cognitive psychology, neuropsychology,
and cognitive neuroscience. Implications of this rethinking are discussed, as well as
considerations of familiarity, indirect measures of memory, and generally what should
be viewed as necessary for episodic memory. This perspective is intended to begin an
iterative process within the field to redefine the meaning of episodic memory and to
ultimately establish a consensus view.
Keywords: episodic memory, non-human animals, recollection, hippocampus
Public Significance Statement
Being able to remember our past experiences, such as the specific event details from a
recent dinner with friends or when you moved to a new city, rely on episodic memory.
Based on the conventional definition proposed by Endel Tulving decades ago, only
humans have episodic memory and it is inexplicably intertwined with consciousness
and introspection. Here I suggest we rethink this definition based on criteria that can
be externally verified and objectively evaluated.
Introduction1
Most of us can think back to the previous week (e.g.,2
a recent dinner with friends) and events of importance3
(e.g., moving to a new place) without much difficulty.4
Can non-human animals engage in similar behaviour?5
By the current definition of episodic memory, this in-6
ability to peer into the introspective behaviours of non-7
human animals means we can only ascribe evidence of8
‘episodic-like’ memory to non-human animals. This9
approach seems overly limited and anthropocentric.10
Here I suggest that we shift toward more objective cri-11
teria for defining episodic memory that do not rely on12
introspection or necessitate conscious recollection. The13
implications of this rethinking are discussed, as well14
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as considerations of familiarity, indirect measures of 15
memory, and generally what should be viewed as nec- 16
essary for episodic memory. Episodic memory is stud- 17
ied in a variety of subfields within psychology, includ- 18
ing cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and cog- 19
nitive neuroscience, in addition to comparative psy- 20
chology. In this article, I draw from converging evi- 21
dence from all of these subfields to suggest a path for- 22
ward that may be consistently and broadly used. By 23
adopting a new definition that can be externally ver- 24
ified, objectively evaluated, and less reliant on self- 25
report, episodic memory can be more consistently as- 26
sessed across a variety of subfields. This perspective is 27
intended to begin an iterative process within the field 28
to redefine the meaning of episodic memory and to ul- 29
timately establish a consensus view. 30
The current definition of episodic memory, as de- 31
scribed in Tulving (2002, p.5), includes a rich charac- 32
terisation of the concept: 33
Episodic memory is a recently evolved, 34
late-developing, and early-deteriorating 35
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past-oriented memory system, more36
vulnerable than other memory systems37
to neuronal dysfunction, and probably38
unique to humans. It makes possible39
mental time travel through subjective40
time, from the present to the past, thus41
allowing one to re-experience, through42
autonoetic awareness, one’s own previous43
experiences. Its operations require, but go44
beyond, the semantic memory system. Re-45
trieving information from episodic memory46
(remembering or conscious recollection) is47
contingent on the establishment of a special48
mental set, dubbed episodic “retrieval49
mode.” Episodic memory is subserved by50
a widely distributed network of cortical51
and subcortical brain regions that overlaps52
with but also extends beyond the networks53
subserving other memory systems. The54
essence of episodic memory lies in the con-55
junction of three concepts—self, autonoetic56
awareness, and subjectively sensed time.57
Critically, Tulving drew a direct and unambiguous cor-58
respondence between systems of memory (episodic, se-59
mantic, and procedural) and the involvement of con-60
sciousness, with episodic memory corresponding to61
autonoetic (self-knowing) consciousness. Based on62
this definition, often it is suggested that animals have63
“episodic-like memory,” rather than episodic memory64
itself, as it cannot be known if an animal has con-65
sciously recalled the information. Moreover, Tulving66
(2002) clearly states that episodic memory as “proba-67
bly unique to humans” and this definition as a whole68
sets up the definition of episodic memory such that69
it only could be available to humans, without saying70
that explicitly; some others have taken similar stances71
with episodic memory (and mental time travel) be-72
ing reserved to humans (Roberts, 2002; Suddendorf &73
Busby, 2003; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Murray74
et al., 2017). Even with regards to episodic memory75
in (human) children, some memory researchers take a76
relatively strict view that may be limited by language77
comprehension–thus attributing a relatively later age78
for the onset of episodic memory abilities (e.g., Roberts,79
2002; Friedman, 1991), while others consider a more80
minimal definition of re-experiencing (e.g., Clayton &81
Russell, 2009; Bauer & Leventon, 2012). Here I suggest82
that Tulving’s definition of episodic memory is overly83
anthropocentric and that we should drop the use of84
“episodic-like” memory. To implement this modifica-85
tion, we need to re-evaluate our definition of episodic86
memory to be independent of conscious recall and shift87
to criteria that can be externally verified and objec-88
tively evaluated, rather than rely on introspective re- 89
ports. Thus, the approach proposed here is to disentan- 90
gle consciousness from the definition of episodic mem- 91
ory and adopt methods that are more objective (e.g., 92
source-memory test vs. remember/know procedure), 93
as well as turn to neuropsychological dissociation find- 94
ings, to remove this dependency. This is not necessarily 95
to suggest that episodic memory and consciousness are 96
not related, but rather to allow for separations in their 97
definitions that can be individually evaluated indepen- 98
dently and rely less on anthropocentric thinking. Ad- 99
mittedly, Tulving (2005) makes a similar argument, but 100
in the opposite direction–suggesting that it is anthro- 101
pocentric to think that animals’ memory works simi- 102
larly to our own. While I agree with the premise of 103
this perspective, my goal is to move further towards 104
objective tests of memory, in contrast to Tulving’s use 105
of introspective judgments. 106
When first proposed, Tulving (1972, p.384) did not 107
have a strong view of episodic and semantic mem- 108
ory as being distinctly different: “I will refer to both 109
kinds of memory as as two stores, or as two systems, 110
but I do this primarily for the convenience of com- 111
munication, rather than as an expression of any pro- 112
found belief about structural or functional separation 113
of the two.” Later, Tulving (1983) strengthened this 114
distinction by suggesting that these two memory sys- 115
tems differed in their biological basis. In subsequent 116
decades, Tulving shifted his view further–Tulving 117
(2002, p.5) stated: “Episodic memory is a recently 118
evolved, late-developing, and early-deteriorating past- 119
oriented memory system, more vulnerable than other 120
memory systems to neuronal dysfunction, and prob- 121
ably unique to humans.” Importantly, Tulving (2002) 122
does acknowledge that his perspective on episodic 123
memory as a concept has changed drastically over the 124
thirty years since his initial 1972 work, so I consider the 125
2002 perspective as the primary definition of episodic 126
memory. (For a more exhaustive overview of how the 127
concept of episodic memory has developed over the 128
decades, see Tulving, 2002; for a brief anecdotal de- 129
scription of the very beginnings of the term episodic 130
memory, see Tulving, 2016.) 131
To reiterate, my goal here is not to suggest that there 132
is no distinction or continuum between episodic and 133
semantic memory, but rather to re-evaluate the defini- 134
tion of episodic memory and our current understand- 135
ing of memory in non-human animals, and to con- 136
sider how we can test for episodic memory more ob- 137
jectively. Tulving (2002) himself comments that some 138
other well-known memory researchers do not agree 139
with his strong distinction between episodic and se- 140
mantic memory, providing us with insight that even 141
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with a contemporary understanding of the literature,142
his criteria for the specific distinction between mem-143
ory systems was not without issues. While others over144
the years have also considered these two systems of145
memory to be quite distinct, as has been true of many146
other topics in cognitive psychology, recent evidence147
has demonstrated that episodic and semantic memory148
share many attributes, lying more along a continuum,149
and being interdependent systems (Craik, 2000, 2020;150
Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010; Saive et al., 2015; Renoult151
et al., 2019).152
Disentangling episodic memory from consciousness153
Returning to Tulving, from when he first made the con-154
nection between episodic memory and consciousness155
(1985, p.1):156
Nowhere is the benign neglect of conscious-157
ness more conspicuous than in the study of158
human memory. One can read article af-159
ter article on memory, or consult book after160
book, without encountering the term “con-161
sciousness.” Such a state of affairs must162
be regarded as rather curious. One might163
think that memory should have something164
to do with remembering, and remember-165
ing is a conscious experience. To remem-166
ber an event means to be consciously aware167
now of something that happened on an ear-168
lier occasion. Nevertheless, through most169
of its history, including the current hey-170
day of cognitive psychology, the psycholog-171
ical study of memory has largely proceeded172
without reference to the existence of con-173
scious awareness in remembering.174
Is this dependency on consciousness necessary? Per-175
haps it is functionally, but–can we test for episodic176
memory independently of consciousness? This re-177
quirement of conscious recall inherently cannot be ev-178
idenced in non-human animals (Clayton et al., 2000),179
leading researchers to refer to what otherwise would180
be considered as episodic memory in humans as181
“episodic-like memory” in animals. Moreover, so-182
called episodic-like memory has been observed in a183
large range of species, including non-human primates184
(Schwartz & Evans, 2001; Schwartz et al., 2005; Men-185
zel, 2005; Hoffman et al., 2009; Basile & Hampton,186
2011; Fagot & Cook, 2006), a variety of avian species187
(Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Clayton et al., 2001; Zen-188
tall et al., 2001; Cook et al., 2005; Fagot & Cook, 2006;189
Skov-Rackette et al., 2006; Dally et al., 2006; Zentall190
et al., 2008; Feeney et al., 2009; González-Gómez et191
al., 2011; Qadri et al., 2018), but also dogs (Fugazza192
et al., 2016; Sluka et al., 2018; Lo & Roberts, 2020), 193
horses (Hanggi & Ingersoll, 2009; Valenchon et al., 194
2013), dolphins (Mercado et al., 1999), cuttlefish (Jozet- 195
Alves et al., 2013), rodents (Babb & Crystal, 2005; Zhou 196
& Crystal, 2009; Davis et al., 2013; Panoz-Brown et al., 197
2016, 2018), and even insects (Pahl et al., 2007; Perry 198
et al., 2017). While it is possible that episodic mem- 199
ory is a cognitive function that is uniquely human– 200
it is more plausible that current distinctions between 201
episodic and episodic-like memory are so similar that 202
it would be more useful to view them both as episodic 203
memory. Moreover, current evidence of episodic-like 204
memory has been used as supportive evidence for the 205
notion of animal consciousness (Griffin & Speck, 2004)– 206
further complicating the usefulness of the current def- 207
initions of episodic and episodic-like memory. Recent 208
behavioural work with non-humans, as well as plants, 209
has further demonstrated that evaluating the presence 210
of consciousness is a complicated topic (Segundo-Ortin 211
& Calvo, 2019; Taiz et al., 2019; Pagán, 2019; Carruthers 212
et al., 2019). Indeed, without turning to self-report, it 213
is difficult to measure consciousness in humans, as the 214
definition of consciousness itself is nebulous at best. 215
While dissociating episodic memory from con- 216
sciousness, it is useful to be reminded that there are 217
terms that may benefit from increased use in the lit- 218
erature, particularly in more precisely characterising 219
the link between episodic memory and conscious- 220
ness. The act of conscious recollection has been termed 221
“ecphory” (Semon, 1921; also see Schacter et al., 1978, 222
and Schacter, 2001), though this term is often falsely 223
attributed to Tulving (e.g., Daselaar et al., 2001; Ki- 224
noshita, 2002; Markowitsch et al., 1999, 2003; Kim, 225
2013). I do not dispute that ecphory is a cognitive 226
process that humans can engage in; but here I suggest 227
that conscious recall, ecphory, should not be considered 228
as a requirement for demonstrating episodic memory 229
ability, and consider that it is unclear whether non- 230
human animals can engage in ecphory. In relation to 231
the Tulving (2002) definition of episodic memory, an al- 232
ternative is to consider that studies provide evidence of 233
episodic memory either with or without ecphory. 234
Defining boundaries of episodic memory 235
Apart from removing the requirement of conscious rec- 236
ollection, a more nuanced discussion of what should be 237
considered as episodic memory is also warranted. An 238
independent, but largely convergent approach may be 239
to make this discrimination based on neurobiological, 240
functional specialization and consider episodic mem- 241
ory to be hippocampal dependent. This approach has 242
the additional benefit of being atheoretical, directly 243
testable, and ensures that cognitive theory is linked 244
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to biology. As such, memory for items without ad-245
ditional contextual information, which can be remem-246
bered by amnesic patients (with hippocampal damage)247
in item-recognition tests (e.g., Mayes et al., 2002; Hold-248
stock et al., 2002, 2005), would not qualify as a suf-249
ficient test of episodic memory. This view is congru-250
ent with Tulving (2002), and corrects an over general-251
ization made by Tulving (1972). Nonetheless, tests of252
memory involving contextual information–e.g., source,253
association, or order–would here be considered as as-254
sessing episodic memory. Additionally, tests of mem-255
ory specificity, such as the mnemonic similarity task256
(Yassa & Stark, 2011; Stark et al., 2013, 2019), where257
recognition is tested for old items as well as similar258
items would also be considered a test of episodic mem-259
ory (i.e., if episodic memory includes a ‘which’ com-260
ponent to differentiate two items that are very similar).261
Considerations of the experimental procedure, and po-262
tentially if the task can be accomplished with a hip-263
pocampal lesion, would sometimes be needed to dis-264
tinguish between a test of contextual memory versus,265
for instance, conditioned place preference. However,266
this is not intended to be a one-to-one mapping, while I267
am suggesting that episodic memory requires the hip-268
pocampus, this does not mean that the hippocampus269
is limited to only being involved in episodic memory270
or that any task that requires the hippocampus is by-271
definition also considered an episodic memory task.272
This perspective of examining contextual memory,273
without regard to interpreting the autonoetic proper-274
ties (which is unmeasurable and introspective), is con-275
sistent with the views of many non-human memory276
researchers (e.g., Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Babb &277
Crystal, 2005; Skov-Rackette et al., 2006; Pahl et al.,278
2007; Feeney et al., 2009; Hoffman et al., 2009; Davis279
et al., 2013; Lo & Roberts, 2020). More directly, hip-280
pocampal volume has been linked to memory capacity281
both within and across non-human species (e.g., Sherry282
et al., 1989; Krebs et al., 1989; Clayton, 1995; Hamp-283
ton & Shettleworth, 1996; Volman et al., 1997; Lee et284
al., 1998; Cnotka et al., 2008). While there is some con-285
vergent evidence of regional hippocampal volume cor-286
relating with memory capacity in humans (Maguire et287
al., 2000, 2006), this relationship may not be present as288
a continuous measure (see Weisberg et al., 2019). Re-289
gardless of inter-individual differences in memory ca-290
pacity, the notion that memory for contextual informa-291
tion (what, where, when, which) is an important as-292
pect of episodic memory and requires the hippocam-293
pus is in line with previous conceptions of episodic294
memory (Tulving, 1983, 1984). This view is also con-295
vergent with Clayton et al. (2000), albeit with a differ-296
ent rationale; though this was no longer sufficient af-297
ter the addition of the requirement of autonoetic expe- 298
riences by Tulving (1985, 2002). Thus, for reasons of 299
both parsimony and objective measurement, here I pro- 300
pose a consistent view also be taken for human mem- 301
ory research–and adopted as the formal definition of 302
episodic memory. I consider the hippocampus as be- 303
ing central to episodic memory based on it’s consistent 304
involvement in recollection, memory for contextual in- 305
formation, and mental time travel. Admittedly, the 306
hippocampus is not a unitary neurobiological structure 307
(e.g., see Small, 2002; Strange et al., 2014; Hrybouski et 308
al., 2019), but I will not be differentiating between the 309
hippocampal subfields or long-axis specialisation here. 310
Reconciling the definition of episodic memory with 311
the broader literature 312
If we are to consider a less restrictive definition of 313
episodic memory, we must, of course, also consider the 314
broader implications. 315
1. Is familiarity a type of episodic memory? 316
While we cannot ask non-human animals to make a 317
subjective judgments of memory recollection versus 318
familiarity–we can, and do, with humans. One of the 319
goals of the present work is to make considerations of 320
the definition of episodic memory serve both. Briefly, 321
when testing memory for individual items with hu- 322
mans, sometimes the participants are asked to evalu- 323
ate if they can recollect qualitative details of an expe- 324
rience (i.e., remember) or merely have a sense of fa- 325
miliarity without these richer details (i.e., knowing). 326
In these tasks, participants are given the option of re- 327
sponding remember, know, or new for each recognition 328
item (Tulving, 1985; Java et al., 1997; Gardiner, 2001; 329
Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006; Migo et al., 2012). To 330
date, this approach to studying memory has been used 331
in hundreds of studies. 332
Providing strong support for the distinction between 333
recollection and familiarity, patients with hippocam- 334
pal damage show selective impairments to recollec- 335
tion and associative processing (e.g., Verfaellie et al., 336
2000; Yonelinas, 2001; Holdstock et al., 2002; Gio- 337
vanello et al., 2003; Mayes et al., 2004; Turriziani et 338
al., 2004; Aggleton et al., 2005; Brandt et al., 2009; 339
Vann et al., 2009). Convergently, neuroimaging stud- 340
ies have demonstrated greater hippocampal activation 341
for recollection-related responses than familiarity re- 342
sponses (e.g., Eldridge et al., 2000; Davachi et al., 2003; 343
Ranganath et al., 2003; Cohn et al., 2009; Mayes et al., 344
2019). Providing evidence of a possible double disso- 345
ciation, Brandt et al. (2016) report on experiments with 346
patient M.R., who has an entorhinal cortex lesion that 347
resulted in impaired familiarity, but intact recollection. 348
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Despite this compelling evidence, it is also important to349
acknowledge that lesions to other brain regions, such350
as in the case of semantic dementia, can also have in-351
fluences on recollection and familiarity (e.g., Hodges &352
Graham, 2001). Recollection responses have also been353
associated with successful retrieval of other contex-354
tual information (e.g., what, where, when, which) (e.g.,355
Saive et al., 2015); when a simple old/new recognition356
task is used, recollection is often considered based on357
source-memory performance (e.g., Davachi et al., 2003;358
Ranganath et al., 2003).359
Given the inherent introspective nature of asking a360
human participant to discriminate between “remem-361
ber” and “know” responses and then mapping these to362
processes corresponding to recollection and familiarity,363
we become too reliant on self-report judgments rather364
than distinguishing between differences in memory365
representations or mechanisms. Indeed, it can be ar-366
gued that greater consideration is needed to define367
what these terms mean in reference to cognitive rep-368
resentations and neurocomputational operations–see369
Cowell et al. (2019) for a more nuanced discussion.370
Moreover, subjective responses are vulnerable to bi-371
ases; for example, there are instances where an amnesic372
patient can recognise an item as well as a healthy con-373
trol participant, but generally has more deficits. Here374
the patient may be unlikely to respond “remember”375
due to their general memory deficits, and this problem376
may also apply to other cohort differences in between-377
groups analyses (see Madan & Singhal, 2013 paper for378
examples in another domain of cognitive psychology).379
If familiarity is not considered sufficient for episodic380
memory, an open question is to consider what it is381
instead. While familiarity is included as a type of382
episodic memory by some (Eldridge et al., 2000; Yoneli-383
nas, 2001), others have classified it as “non-episodic”384
(Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006; Palombo et al., 2015)385
or as a type of semantic memory (Yonelinas, 2002;386
Yonelinas et al., 2002; Zentall et al., 2008; Bartsch387
et al., 2011)–including Tulving in the past (Tulving,388
1985). Some have also considered familiarity as be-389
ing influenced by a mixture of both episodic and se-390
mantic memory (as well as other processes) (e.g., Ja-391
coby & Dallas, 1981; Johnston et al., 1991; Whittle-392
sea, 1993; Dewhurst & Hitch, 1997; Schacter et al.,393
1999; Budson et al., 2006; Migo et al., 2012; Wang et394
al., 2018), and this is the position most strongly sup-395
ported by current evidence. This mixture view of fa-396
miliarity could also be considered as a combination of397
both general (semantic) item familiarity (e.g., Gilhooly398
& Logie, 1980) and episodic memory traces, similarly399
to the distinction between primary and secondary dis-400
tinctiveness (Schmidt, 1991). Primary distinctiveness is401
based on being distinct in salience/congruity within a 402
local, episodic context (e.g., akin to an oddball or von- 403
Restorff paradigm); secondary distinctiveness is in- 404
stead in distinct relation to general knowledge or expe- 405
riences, thus corresponding to semantic memory. One 406
approach that has been demonstrated to be successful 407
with both humans and non-humans in decreasing the 408
influence of familiarity in recognition procedures is to 409
ensure that all items have been pre-familiarised such 410
that the lures are not entirely ‘new’ to the experimental 411
task and to match lures as closely as possible to the old 412
items (e.g., Panoz-Brown et al., 2016; Brady & Hamp- 413
ton, 2018; Madan et al., 2017). 414
Given this boundary criterion of familiarity being in- 415
sufficient for qualifying as episodic memory, what re- 416
mains and follows from dual-process theory is recol- 417
lection. More broadly, this can be considered as mem- 418
ory for items along with contextual information, such 419
as location, time, value, or any of a myriad of other 420
attributes that can be considered evidence of remem- 421
bered source information. Though few studies have 422
done so, source memory can be tested in non-human 423
animals (e.g., Crystal et al., 2013). 424
2. Which memory measures evaluate episodic mem- 425
ory? 426
Not all memory measures are necessarily dependent 427
on episodic memory. As already discussed, old/new 428
recognition can be relatively spared with hippocampal 429
damage (e.g., Mayes et al., 2002; Holdstock et al., 2002, 430
2005). In contrast, performance was highly impaired in 431
recall tests. This distinction between recognition and 432
a recall/generation process can be critical to the neces- 433
sity of hippocampal engagement. With humans, it can 434
sometimes be difficult to implement a recall test due 435
to its requisite open-ended nature, rather than a match- 436
to-sample recognition procedure, in some experimental 437
settings, e.g., in an MRI scanner. Nonetheless, the use 438
of modified procedures such as a hybrid metamemory– 439
cued recall (e.g., Caplan & Madan, 2016; Madan et al., 440
2017) or item-recognition–cued recall (e.g., Madan et 441
al., 2020) procedure can be used to increase sensitivity 442
to hippocampal engagement. 443
Another important distinction in memory test proce- 444
dures, with humans, is the use of direct or indirect mea- 445
sures (Johnson & Hasher, 1987; Richardson-Klavehn 446
& Bjork, 1988). Briefly, direct memory measures ask 447
the participant directly to make memory-related re- 448
sponses, such as old/new recognition, free recall, asso- 449
ciative recognition, or cued recall. Indirect measures, in 450
contrast, are ones where memory may ‘spill-over’ and 451
influence the participants’ response, but is not directly 452
asked for, such as lexical decision, word-stem comple- 453
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tion, or preference ratings. (Note, many would instead454
refer to these as explicit vs. implicit tests of memory,455
but that involves an inference about the nature of mem-456
ory systems themselves, rather than being a more ob-457
jective characterisation of the task design.) With some458
consideration, both recognition and recall can be eval-459
uated using both direct and indirect memory measures460
(see Jacoby & Hollingshead, 1990).461
A key difference between direct and indirect mea-462
sures of memory is the necessity of conscious recollec-463
tion (i.e., ecphory) (Johnson & Hasher, 1987). Based464
on Tulving’s (2002) definition of episodic memory, a465
direst test of memory that is associated with a success-466
ful memory must engage ecphory, whereas a forgotten467
memory would not involve ecphory. Tulving’s defini-468
tion would further suggest that indirect measures of469
memory cannot be based on episodic memory. How-470
ever, if one were trained to associate individual words471
with reward values and then be presented with these472
words again in a lexical decision test (as in Madan et al.,473
2012; Chakravarty et al., 2019), an influence of reward474
value on lexical decision response time is one based on475
episodic memory, not a change in the word’s seman-476
tic meaning. Is this judgement on the reliance of item–477
value associations on episodic memory contingent on478
whether the participant is or is not able to explicitly479
recall the value of an item in a value-judgement task?480
This is one instance of where the current perspective’s481
boundaries for episodic memory still remains hazy.482
Further complicating matters, some memory tasks can483
be accomplished with a mixture of different strategies,484
where one is likely hippocampal dependent and an-485
other relies on a different memory system (e.g., basal486
ganglia) (e.g., Iaria et al., 2003; Dahmani & Bohbot,487
2015).488
Tests of episodic(-like) memory in animals are often489
recognition. Moreover, given these definitions of direct490
and indirect tests–all (or at least, most) tests of mem-491
ory in animals would be indirect measures of mem-492
ory, and are rather tests of preference. Specifically, an-493
imals cannot be instructed and memory tests are effec-494
tively reliant on past reward histories guiding choice495
in combination with familiarity/novelty signals. How-496
ever, some studies have used more complex procedures497
to distinguish responses based on item–source/context498
associations from those that would be based on merely499
preference due to familiarity/recency (Crystal et al.,500
2013; Panoz-Brown et al., 2016).501
3. Difficulties in testing memory in non-human ani-502
mals503
When studying memory in non-human animals, it can504
be difficult to separate a test of memory from a test of505
choice or preference; for instance, if the study involves 506
associating items with reward outcomes (e.g. Madan 507
& Spetch, 2012; Madan et al., 2014, 2019; Ludvig et 508
al., 2014). As a result, some tasks that are relatively 509
straightforward to conduct in humans cannot be trans- 510
lated to non-human animals. 511
More broadly, Tulving (2002) expressed that there 512
was no evidence that non-human animals can engage 513
in mental time travel. While this may have seemed 514
more clear-cut at the time, research in the past two 515
decades has provided evidence of mental time travel in 516
non-human animals. For instance, Clayton and Dick- 517
inson (1998) conducted a well-designed study where 518
scrub jays cached perishable food (wax-moth larvae) 519
and non-perishable food (peanuts). When allowed to 520
retrieve the stored food after a short delay, they pre- 521
ferred the fresh larvae. When recovering food after 522
a long interval, the jays quickly learned to avoid the 523
now-decayed larvae and to instead recover the cached 524
peanuts. This study provides relatively clear evidence 525
that the jays not only remembered where they had 526
cached food, but also which food was cached at each 527
location and when it has been cached–allowing the jay 528
to infer the fresh or decayed state in the case of the per- 529
ishable larvae. 530
Providing a more direct example of mental time 531
travel, we can also turn to the behaviour labeled ‘vi- 532
carious trial-and-error learning.’ Here, researchers 533
had observed that when navigating complex T- 534
mazes, rats would sometimes stop at the choice- 535
point/intersections and look at either potential path- 536
way, seemingly to deliberately consider the potential 537
outcomes of the decision (Muenzinger, 1938; Tolman, 538
1939, 1948). More recent work has explored this be- 539
haviour further, more explicitly linking it to prospective 540
hippocampal firing rate activity (sometimes referred 541
to as “preplay”) and mental time travel (Redish, 2016; 542
Dragoi & Tonegawa, 2013; Ólafsdóttir et al., 2015; de 543
la Prida, 2020; Kay et al., 2020). While it is difficult 544
or even impossible to gain true insight into the intro- 545
spective process that this behaviour corresponds to, it 546
is plausible that it corresponds to a conscious recollec- 547
tion experience. Regardless, it must be conceded that 548
this procedure has provided more objective evidence 549
of episodic memory than the subjective criterion that is 550
currently used with humans based on self-report in a 551
remember/know procedure. 552
Despite there being some evidence of mental time 553
travel in non-human animals, this ability may not be 554
necessary to demonstrate memory for contextual infor- 555
mation (i.e., what, when, where, which) in these tasks 556
in some or all other species. That is, even when mental 557
time travel is possible, it may not be the same ‘strategy’ 558
RETHINKING EPISODIC MEMORY 7
used by animals when presented with a task in which a559
human would engage in mental time travel. While this560
makes interpreting behavioural findings more com-561
plex, it also provides further motivation for the de-562
velopment of objective, non-introspective, measures of563
episodic memory.564
A new definition of episodic memory565
To provide a summary of the suggestions made in this566
article, here I propose a new definition of episodic567
memory:568
Episodic memory is the remembrance of one’s own569
previous experiences and can be done by both human570
and non-human animals. Episodic memory is sup-571
ported by a distributed network of cortical and sub-572
cortical brain regions, but requires the involvement of573
the hippocampus–unlike other memory systems. Men-574
tal time travel, the re-experiencing or imagining of a575
sequence of events, is dependent on episodic memory.576
Familiarity may involve episodic memory but is not a577
type of episodic memory, as familiarity is also depen-578
dent on other memory processes.579
Additionally, this new definition does not require580
conscious recollection and there is no distinction be-581
tween episodic and episodic-like memory. When possi-582
ble, self-report distinctions between memory processes583
should be avoided (e.g., remember/know procedures)584
and should be instead tested using source-memory or585
item-strength (such as confidence ratings) procedures.586
Conclusion587
While there is a need for consistent definitions in the lit-588
erature, there also is a need to periodically re-evaluate589
these definitions as a facet of moving the field for-590
ward. The evidence presented here is suggestive of a591
less restrictive and more parsimonious view of episodic592
memory that can be more objectively evaluated empir-593
ically. Several takeaway messages are discussed in this594
article, not the least of which is that researchers of hu-595
man memory may underestimate the extent of mem-596
ory phenomena that can also be found in non-human597
animals, for instance, false memories (Millin & Riccio,598
2019). The perspective presented here can be refined599
further, but hopefully represents a notable step forward600
in how we understand and assess episodic memory.601
Acknowledgments602
I would like to thank Daniela Palombo for insightful603
discussions that helped refine the ideas presented in604
this manuscript.605
References 606
Aggleton, J. P., Vann, S. D., Denby, C., Dix, S., Mayes, A. R., 607
Roberts, N., & Yonelinas, A. P. (2005). Sparing of the famil- 608
iarity component of recognition memory in a patient with 609
hippocampal pathology. Neuropsychologia, 43, 1810–1823. 610
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2005.01.019 611
Babb, S. J., & Crystal, J. D. (2005). Discrimination of what, 612
when, and where: Implications for episodic-like mem- 613
ory in rats. Learning and Motivation, 36, 177–189. doi: 614
10.1016/j.lmot.2005.02.009 615
Bartsch, T., Dohring, J., Rohr, A., Jansen, O., & Deuschl, 616
G. (2011). CA1 neurons in the human hippocampus 617
are critical for autobiographical memory, mental time 618
travel, and autonoetic consciousness. Proceedings of the 619
National Academy of Sciences USA, 108, 17562–17567. doi: 620
10.1073/pnas.1110266108 621
Basile, B. M., & Hampton, R. R. (2011). Monkeys recall and 622
reproduce simple shapes from memory. Current Biology, 623
21, 774–778. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2011.03.044 624
Bauer, P. J., & Leventon, J. S. (2012). Memory for one-time 625
experiences in the second year of life: Implications for 626
the status of episodic memory. Infancy, 18, 755–781. doi: 627
10.1111/infa.12005 628
Brady, R. J., & Hampton, R. R. (2018). Nonverbal working 629
memory for novel images in rhesus monkeys. Current Bi- 630
ology, 28, 3903–3910. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2018.10.025 631
Brandt, K. R., Eysenck, M. W., Nielsen, M. K., & von 632
Oertzen, T. J. (2016). Selective lesion to the entorhi- 633
nal cortex leads to an impairment in familiarity but 634
not recollection. Brain and Cognition, 104, 82–92. doi: 635
10.1016/j.bandc.2016.02.005 636
Brandt, K. R., Gardiner, J. M., Vargha-Khadem, F., Baddeley, 637
A. D., & Mishkin, M. (2009). Impairment of recollection 638
but not familiarity in a case of developmental amnesia. 639
Neurocase, 15, 60–65. doi: 10.1080/13554790802613025 640
Budson, A. E., Todman, R. W., Chong, H., Adams, E. H., 641
Kensinger, E. A., Krangel, T. S., & Wright, C. I. (2006). 642
False recognition of emotional word lists in aging and 643
alzheimer disease. Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology, 19, 644
71–78. doi: 10.1097/01.wnn.0000213905.49525.d0 645
Caplan, J. B., & Madan, C. R. (2016). Word imageability 646
enhances association-memory by increasing hippocampal 647
engagement. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 28, 1522– 648
1538. doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00992 649
Carruthers, G., Carls-Diamante, S., Huang, L., Rosen, M., 650
& Schier, E. (2019). How to operationalise conscious- 651
ness. Australian Journal of Psychology, 71, 390–410. doi: 652
10.1111/ajpy.12264 653
Chakravarty, S., Fujiwara, E., Madan, C. R., Tomlinson, S. E., 654
Ober, I., & Caplan, J. B. (2019). Value bias of verbal 655
memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 107, 25–39. doi: 656
10.1016/j.jml.2019.03.005 657
Clayton, N. S. (1995). Development of memory and the 658
hippocampus: comparison of food-storing and nonstoring 659
birds on a one-trial associative memory task. The Journal of 660
Neuroscience, 15, 2796–2807. doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.15-04- 661
02796.1995 662
8 CHRISTOPHER R. MADAN
Clayton, N. S., & Dickinson, A. (1998). Episodic-like memory663
during cache recovery by scrub jays. Nature, 395, 272–274.664
doi: 10.1038/26216665
Clayton, N. S., Griffiths, D. P., & Dickinson, A. (2000). Declar-666
ative and episodic-like memory in animals: Personal mus-667
ings of a scrub jay. In C. Heyes & L. Huber (Eds.), The668
evolution of cognition (pp. 273–288). MIT Press.669
Clayton, N. S., & Russell, J. (2009). Looking for episodic670
memory in animals and young children: Prospects for a671
new minimalism. Neuropsychologia, 47, 2330–2340. doi:672
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.10.011673
Clayton, N. S., Yu, K. S., & Dickinson, A. (2001). Scrub jays674
(Aphelocoma coerulescens) form integrated memories of the675
multiple features of caching episodes. Journal of Experi-676
mental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 27, 17–29. doi:677
10.1037/0097-7403.27.1.17678
Cnotka, J., Möhle, M., & Rehkämper, G. (2008). Naviga-679
tional experience affects hippocampus size in homing pi-680
geons. Brain, Behavior and Evolution, 72, 233–238. doi:681
10.1159/000165102682
Cohn, M., Moscovitch, M., Lahat, A., & McAndrews, M. P.683
(2009). Recollection versus strength as the primary deter-684
minant of hippocampal engagement at retrieval. Proceed-685
ings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 106, 22451–686
22455. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0908651106687
Cook, R. G., Levison, D. G., Gillett, S. R., & Blaisdell, A. P.688
(2005). Capacity and limits of associative memory in pi-689
geons. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12, 350–358. doi:690
10.3758/bf03196384691
Cowell, R. A., Barense, M. D., & Sadil, P. S. (2019). A roadmap692
for understanding memory: Decomposing cognitive pro-693
cesses into operations and representations. eNeuro, 6,694
0122–19.2019. doi: 10.1523/eneuro.0122-19.2019695
Craik, F. I. M. (2000). Age-related changes in human mem-696
ory. In D. C. Park & N. Schwarz (Eds.), Cognitive aging: A697
primer (pp. 75–92). Psychology Press.698
Craik, F. I. M. (2020). Remembering: An activity of699
mind and brain. Annual Review of Psychology, 71. doi:700
10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051027701
Crystal, J. D., Alford, W. T., Zhou, W., & Hohmann, A. G.702
(2013). Source memory in the rat. Current Biology, 23, 387–703
391. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2013.01.023704
Dahmani, L., & Bohbot, V. D. (2015). Dissociable con-705
tributions of the prefrontal cortex to hippocampus- and706
caudate nucleus-dependent virtual navigation strategies.707
Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 117, 42–50. doi:708
10.1016/j.nlm.2014.07.002709
Dally, J. M., Emery, N. J., & Clayton, N. S. (2006). Food-710
caching western scrub-jays keep track of who was watch-711
ing when. Science, 312, 1662–1665. doi: 10.1126/sci-712
ence.1126539713
Daselaar, S. M., Rombouts, S. A. R. B., Veltman, D. J., Raai-714
jmakers, J. G. W., Lazeron, R. H. C., & Jonker, C. (2001).715
Parahippocampal activation during successful recognition716
of words: A self-paced event-related fMRI study. NeuroIm-717
age, 13, 1113–1120. doi: 10.1006/nimg.2001.0758718
Davachi, L., Mitchell, J. P., & Wagner, A. D. (2003). Multi-719
ple routes to memory: Distinct medial temporal lobe pro-720
cesses build item and source memories. Proceedings of the 721
National Academy of Sciences USA, 100, 2157–2162. doi: 722
10.1073/pnas.0337195100 723
Davis, K. E., Easton, A., Eacott, M. J., & Gigg, J. (2013). 724
Episodic-like memory for what-where-which occasion is 725
selectively impaired in the 3xTgAD mouse model of 726
Alzheimer’s disease. Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease, 33, 727
681–698. doi: 10.3233/JAD-2012-121543 728
de la Prida, L. M. (2020). Potential factors influencing re- 729
play across CA1 during sharp-wave ripples. Philosophical 730
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 375, 731
20190236. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2019.0236 732
Dewhurst, S. A., & Hitch, G. J. (1997). Illusions of famil- 733
iarity caused by cohort activation. Psychonomic Bulletin & 734
Review, 4, 566–571. doi: 10.3758/bf03214350 735
Dragoi, G., & Tonegawa, S. (2013). Distinct preplay of mul- 736
tiple novel spatial experiences in the rat. Proceedings of 737
the National Academy of Sciences USA, 110, 9100–9105. doi: 738
10.1073/pnas.1306031110 739
Dudukovic, N. M., & Knowlton, B. J. (2006). Re- 740
member/know judgments and retrieval of contextual 741
details. Acta Psychologica, 122, 160–173. doi: 742
10.1016/j.actpsy.2005.11.002 743
Eldridge, L. L., Knowlton, B. J., Furmanski, C. S., Bookheimer, 744
S. Y., & Engel, S. A. (2000). Remembering episodes: a se- 745
lective role for the hippocampus during retrieval. Nature 746
Neuroscience, 3, 1149–1152. doi: 10.1038/80671 747
Fagot, J., & Cook, R. G. (2006). Evidence for large long-term 748
memory capacities in baboons and pigeons and its impli- 749
cations for learning and the evolution of cognition. Pro- 750
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 103, 17564– 751
17567. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0605184103 752
Feeney, M. C., Roberts, W. A., & Sherry, D. F. (2009). Memory 753
for what, where, and when in the black-capped chickadee 754
(Poecile atricapillus). Animal Cognition, 12, 767–777. doi: 755
10.1007/s10071-009-0236-x 756
Friedman, W. J. (1991). The development of children’s mem- 757
ory for the time of past events. Child Development, 62, 139– 758
155. doi: 10.2307/1130710 759
Fugazza, C., Pogány, Á., & Miklósi, Á. (2016). Recall of 760
others’ actions after incidental encoding reveals episodic- 761
like memory in dogs. Current Biology, 26, 3209–3213. doi: 762
10.1016/j.cub.2016.09.057 763
Gardiner, J. M. (2001). Episodic memory and autonoetic con- 764
sciousness: a first-person approach. Philosophical Transac- 765
tions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sci- 766
ences, 356, 1351–1361. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2001.0955 767
Gilhooly, K. J., & Logie, R. H. (1980). Age-of-acquisition, im- 768
agery, concreteness, familiarity, and ambiguity measures 769
for 1, 944 words. Behavior Research Methods & Instrumenta- 770
tion, 12, 395–427. doi: 10.3758/bf03201693 771
Giovanello, K. S., Verfaellie, M., & Keane, M. M. (2003). 772
Disproportionate deficit in associative recognition rela- 773
tive to item recognition in global amnesia. Cognitive, 774
Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 3, 186–194. doi: 775
10.3758/cabn.3.3.186 776
González-Gómez, P. L., Bozinovic, F., & Vásquez, R. A. 777
(2011). Elements of episodic-like memory in free-living 778
RETHINKING EPISODIC MEMORY 9
hummingbirds, energetic consequences. Animal Behaviour,779
81, 1257–1262. doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.03.014780
Greenberg, D. L., & Verfaellie, M. (2010). Interdependence of781
episodic and semantic memory: Evidence from neuropsy-782
chology. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Soci-783
ety, 16, 748–753. doi: 10.1017/s1355617710000676784
Griffin, D. R., & Speck, G. B. (2004). New evidence of785
animal consciousness. Animal Cognition, 7, 5–18. doi:786
10.1007/s10071-003-0203-x787
Hampton, R. R., & Shettleworth, S. J. (1996). Hippocam-788
pus and memory in a food-storing and in a nonstoring789
bird species. Behavioral Neuroscience, 110, 946–964. doi:790
10.1037/0735-7044.110.5.946791
Hanggi, E. B., & Ingersoll, J. F. (2009). Long-term memory for792
categories and concepts in horses (Equus caballus). Animal793
Cognition, 12, 451–462. doi: 10.1007/s10071-008-0205-9794
Hodges, J. R., & Graham, K. S. (2001). Episodic memory: in-795
sights from semantic dementia. Philosophical Transactions of796
the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 356,797
1423–1434. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2001.0943798
Hoffman, M. L., Beran, M. J., & Washburn, D. A. (2009).799
Memory for ‘what’, ‘where’, and ‘when’ information in800
rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Journal of Experimental801
Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 35, 143–152. doi:802
10.1037/a0013295803
Holdstock, J. S., Mayes, A. R., Gong, Q. Y., Roberts, N., &804
Kapur, N. (2005). Item recognition is less impaired than805
recall and associative recognition in a patient with selec-806
tive hippocampal damage. Hippocampus, 15, 203–215. doi:807
10.1002/hipo.20046808
Holdstock, J. S., Mayes, A. R., Roberts, N., Cezayirli, E., Isaac,809
C. L., O’Reilly, R. C., & Norman, K. A. (2002). Under what810
conditions is recognition spared relative to recall after se-811
lective hippocampal damage in humans? Hippocampus,812
12, 341–351. doi: 10.1002/hipo.10011813
Hrybouski, S., MacGillivray, M., Huang, Y., Madan, C. R.,814
Carter, R., Seres, P., & Malykhin, N. V. (2019).815
Involvement of hippocampal subfields and anterior-816
posterior subregions in encoding and retrieval of item,817
spatial, and associative memories: Longitudinal ver-818
sus transverse axis. NeuroImage, 568–586. doi:819
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2019.01.061820
Iaria, G., Petrides, M., Dagher, A., Pike, B., & Bohbot, V. D.821
(2003). Cognitive strategies dependent on the hippocam-822
pus and caudate nucleus in human navigation: Variability823
and change with practice. Journal of Neuroscience, 23, 5945–824
5952. doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.23-13-05945.2003825
Jacoby, L. L., & Dallas, M. (1981). On the relationship between826
autobiographical memory and perceptual learning. Jour-827
nal of Experimental Psychology: General, 110, 306–340. doi:828
10.1037/0096-3445.110.3.306829
Jacoby, L. L., & Hollingshead, A. (1990). Toward a gener-830
ate/recognize model of performance on direct and indi-831
rect tests of memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 29,832
433–454. doi: 10.1016/0749-596x(90)90065-8833
Java, R. I., Gregg, V. H., & Gardiner, J. M. (1997). What834
do people actually remember (and know) in ‘remem-835
ber/know’ experiments? European Journal of Cognitive Psy-836
chology, 9, 187–197. doi: 10.1080/713752553 837
Johnson, M. K., & Hasher, L. (1987). Human learning and 838
memory. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 631–668. doi: 839
10.1146/annurev.ps.38.020187.003215 840
Johnston, W. A., Hawley, K. J., & Elliott, J. M. (1991). Con- 841
tribution of perceptual fluency to recognition judgments. 842
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 843
Cognition, 17, 210–223. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.17.2.210 844
Jozet-Alves, C., Bertin, M., & Clayton, N. S. (2013). Evidence 845
of episodic-like memory in cuttlefish. Current Biology, 23, 846
R1033–R1035. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2013.10.021 847
Kay, K., Chung, J. E., Sosa, M., Schor, J. S., Karlsson, M. P., 848
Larkin, M. C., . . . Frank, L. M. (2020). Constant sub- 849
second cycling between representations of possible fu- 850
tures in the hippocampus. Cell, 180, 552–567.e25. doi: 851
10.1016/j.cell.2020.01.014 852
Kim, H. (2013). Differential neural activity in the recognition 853
of old versus new events: An activation likelihood esti- 854
mation meta-analysis. Human Brain Mapping, 34, 814–836. 855
doi: 10.1002/hbm.21474 856
Kinoshita, S. (2002). Feeling of familiarity. In P. Chambres, 857
M. Izaute, & P.-J. Marescaux (Eds.), Metacognition (pp. 79– 858
90). Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4615-1099-4_6 859
Krebs, J. R., Sherry, D. F., Healy, S. D., Perry, V. H., & Vac- 860
carino, A. L. (1989). Hippocampal specialization of food- 861
storing birds. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 862
USA, 86, 1388–1392. doi: 10.1073/pnas.86.4.1388 863
Lee, D. W., Miyasato, L. E., & Clayton, N. S. (1998). Rela- 864
tiveneurobiological bases of spatial learning in the natural 865
environment: neurogenesis and growth in the avian and 866
mammalian hippocampus. NeuroReport, 9, R15–R27. 867
Lo, K. H., & Roberts, W. A. (2020). Dogs (Canis familiaris) 868
use odor cues to show episodic-like memory for what, 869
where, and when. Journal of Comparative Psychology. doi: 870
10.1037/com0000174 871
Ludvig, E. A., Madan, C. R., Pisklak, J. M., & Spetch, M. L. 872
(2014). Reward context determines risky choice in pigeons 873
and humans. Biology Letters, 10, 20140451–20140451. doi: 874
10.1098/rsbl.2014.0451 875
Madan, C. R., Fujiwara, E., Caplan, J. B., & Sommer, T. (2017). 876
Emotional arousal impairs association-memory: Roles of 877
amygdala and hippocampus. NeuroImage, 156, 14–28. doi: 878
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.04.065 879
Madan, C. R., Fujiwara, E., Gerson, B. C., & Caplan, J. B. 880
(2012). High reward makes items easier to remember, but 881
harder to bind to a new temporal context. Frontiers in Inte- 882
grative Neuroscience, 6. doi: 10.3389/fnint.2012.00061 883
Madan, C. R., Knight, A. G., Kensinger, E. A., & Stein- 884
metz, K. R. M. (2020). Affect enhances object- 885
background associations: evidence from behaviour and 886
mathematical modelling. Cognition and Emotion. doi: 887
10.1080/02699931.2019.1710110 888
Madan, C. R., Ludvig, E. A., & Spetch, M. L. (2014). Remem- 889
bering the best and worst of times: Memories for extreme 890
outcomes bias risky decisions. Psychonomic Bulletin & Re- 891
view, 21, 629–636. doi: 10.3758/s13423-013-0542-9 892
Madan, C. R., Ludvig, E. A., & Spetch, M. L. (2019). Com- 893
parative inspiration: From puzzles with pigeons to novel 894
10 CHRISTOPHER R. MADAN
discoveries with humans in risky choice. Behavioural Pro-895
cesses, 160, 10–19. doi: 10.1016/j.beproc.2018.12.009896
Madan, C. R., & Singhal, A. (2013). Introducing TAMI: An ob-897
jective test of ability in movement imagery. Journal of Motor898
Behavior, 45, 153–166. doi: 10.1080/00222895.2013.763764899
Madan, C. R., & Spetch, M. L. (2012). Is the en-900
hancement of memory due to reward driven by value901
or salience? Acta Psychologica, 139, 343–349. doi:902
10.1016/j.actpsy.2011.12.010903
Maguire, E. A., Gadian, D. G., Johnsrude, I. S., Good, C. D.,904
Ashburner, J., Frackowiak, R. S. J., & Frith, C. D. (2000).905
Navigation-related structural change in the hippocampi of906
taxi drivers. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences907
USA, 97, 4398–4403. doi: 10.1073/pnas.070039597908
Maguire, E. A., Woollett, K., & Spiers, H. J. (2006). London909
taxi drivers and bus drivers: A structural MRI and neu-910
ropsychological analysis. Hippocampus, 16, 1091–1101. doi:911
10.1002/hipo.20233912
Markowitsch, H. J., Calabrese, P., Neufeld, H., Gehlen,913
W., & Durwen, H. F. (1999). Retrograde amnesia for914
world knowledge and preserved memory for autobio-915
graphic events. a case report. Cortex, 35, 243–252. doi:916
10.1016/s0010-9452(08)70797-4917
Markowitsch, H. J., Vandekerckhove, M. P., Lanfermann, H.,918
& Russ, M. O. (2003). Engagement of lateral and me-919
dial prefrontal areas in the ecphory of sad and happy920
autobiographical memories. Cortex, 39, 643–665. doi:921
10.1016/s0010-9452(08)70858-x922
Mayes, A. R., Holdstock, J. S., Isaac, C., Montaldi, D., Grigor,923
J., Gummer, A., . . . Norman, K. A. (2004). Associative924
recognition in a patient with selective hippocampal lesions925
and relatively normal item recognition. Hippocampus, 14,926
763–784. doi: 10.1002/hipo.10211927
Mayes, A. R., Holdstock, J. S., Isaac, C. L., Hunkin, N. M.,928
& Roberts, N. (2002). Relative sparing of item recogni-929
tion memory in a patient with adult-onset damage lim-930
ited to the hippocampus. Hippocampus, 12, 325–340. doi:931
10.1002/hipo.1111932
Mayes, A. R., Montaldi, D., Roper, A., Migo, E. M., Gholipour,933
T., & Kafkas, A. (2019). Amount, not strength of recollec-934
tion, drives hippocampal activity: A problem for appar-935
ent word familiarity-related hippocampal activation. Hip-936
pocampus, 29, 46–59. doi: 10.1002/hipo.23031937
Menzel, C. (2005). Progress in the study of chimpanzee re-938
call and episodic memory. In H. S. Terrace & J. Metcalfe939
(Eds.), The missing link in cognition: Origins of self-reflective940
consciousness (pp. 188–224). Oxford University Press. doi:941
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161564.003.0008942
Mercado, E., Uyeyama, R. K., Pack, A. A., & Herman,943
L. M. (1999). Memory for action events in the bot-944
tlenosed dolphin. Animal Cognition, 2, 17–25. doi:945
10.1007/s100710050021946
Migo, E. M., Mayes, A. R., & Montaldi, D. (2012). Measur-947
ing recollection and familiarity: Improving the remem-948
ber/know procedure. Consciousness and Cognition, 21,949
1435–1455. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2012.04.014950
Millin, P. M., & Riccio, D. C. (2019). False memory in non-951
human animals. Learning & Memory, 26, 381–386. doi:952
10.1101/lm.050054.119 953
Muenzinger, K. F. (1938). Vicarious trial and error at a point 954
of choice: I. A general survey of its relation to learning 955
efficiency. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 53, 75–86. doi: 956
10.1080/08856559.1938.10533799 957
Murray, E. A., Wise, S. P., & Graham, K. S. (2017). The Evo- 958
lution of Memory Systems. Oxford University Press. doi: 959
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686438.001.0001 960
Ólafsdóttir, H. F., Barry, C., Saleem, A. B., Hassabis, D., & 961
Spiers, H. J. (2015). Hippocampal place cells construct re- 962
ward related sequences through unexplored space. eLife, 963
4. doi: 10.7554/elife.06063 964
Pagán, O. R. (2019). The brain: a concept in flux. Philosophical 965
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 374, 966
20180383. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2018.0383 967
Pahl, M., Zhu, H., Pix, W., Tautz, J., & Zhang, S. (2007). Circa- 968
dian timed episodic-like memory a bee knows what to do 969
when, and also where. Journal of Experimental Biology, 210, 970
3559–3567. doi: 10.1242/jeb.005488 971
Palombo, D. J., Alain, C., Söderlund, H., Khuu, W., 972
& Levine, B. (2015). Severely deficient autobio- 973
graphical memory (SDAM) in healthy adults: A new 974
mnemonic syndrome. Neuropsychologia, 72, 105–118. doi: 975
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2015.04.012 976
Panoz-Brown, D., Corbin, H. E., Dalecki, S. J., Gentry, M., 977
Brotheridge, S., Sluka, C. M., . . . Crystal, J. D. (2016). Rats 978
remember items in context using episodic memory. Cur- 979
rent Biology, 26, 2821–2826. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2016.08.023 980
Panoz-Brown, D., Iyer, V., Carey, L. M., Sluka, C. M., Rajic, G., 981
Kestenman, J., . . . Crystal, J. D. (2018). Replay of episodic 982
memories in the rat. Current Biology, 28, 1628–1634.e7. doi: 983
10.1016/j.cub.2018.04.006 984
Perry, C. J., Barron, A. B., & Chittka, L. (2017). The frontiers 985
of insect cognition. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 986
16, 111–118. doi: 10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.05.011 987
Qadri, M. A. J., Leonard, K., Cook, R. G., & Kelly, D. M. (2018). 988
Examination of long-term visual memorization capacity in 989
the clark’s nutcracker (Nucifraga columbiana). Psychonomic 990
Bulletin & Review, 25, 2274–2280. doi: 10.3758/s13423-018- 991
1439-4 992
Ranganath, C., Yonelinas, A. P., Cohen, M. X., Dy, C. J., 993
Tom, S. M., & D’Esposito, M. (2003). Dissociable 994
correlates of recollection and familiarity within the me- 995
dial temporal lobes. Neuropsychologia, 42, 2–13. doi: 996
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2003.07.006 997
Redish, A. D. (2016). Vicarious trial and error. Nature Reviews 998
Neuroscience, 17, 147–159. doi: 10.1038/nrn.2015.30 999
Renoult, L., Irish, M., Moscovitch, M., & Rugg, M. D. (2019). 1000
From knowing to remembering: The semantic–episodic 1001
distinction. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 23, 1041–1057. doi: 1002
10.1016/j.tics.2019.09.008 1003
Richardson-Klavehn, A., & Bjork, R. A. (1988). Measures of 1004
memory. Annual Review of Psychology, 39, 475–543. doi: 1005
10.1146/annurev.ps.39.020188.002355 1006
Roberts, W. A. (2002). Are animals stuck in time? Psy- 1007
chological Bulletin, 128, 473–489. doi: 10.1037/0033- 1008
2909.128.3.473 1009
Saive, A.-L., Royet, J.-P., Garcia, S., Thévenet, M., & Plailly, 1010
RETHINKING EPISODIC MEMORY 11
J. (2015). “What-where-which” episodic retrieval re-1011
quires conscious recollection and is promoted by semantic1012
knowledge. PLOS ONE, 10, e0143767. doi: 10.1371/jour-1013
nal.pone.01437671014
Schacter, D. L. (2001). Forgotten ideas, neglected pioneers:1015
Richard Semon and the story of memory. Psychology Press.1016
doi: 10.4324/97802037201341017
Schacter, D. L., Eich, J. E., & Tulving, E. (1978). Richard1018
Semon’s theory of memory. Journal of Verbal Learning1019
and Verbal Behavior, 17, 721–743. doi: 10.1016/s0022-1020
5371(78)90443-71021
Schacter, D. L., Israel, L., & Racine, C. (1999). Suppressing1022
false recognition in younger and older adults: The distinc-1023
tiveness heuristic. Journal of Memory and Language, 40, 1–1024
24. doi: 10.1006/jmla.1998.26111025
Schmidt, S. R. (1991). Can we have a distinctive theory1026
of memory? Memory & Cognition, 19, 523–542. doi:1027
10.3758/bf031971491028
Schwartz, B. L., & Evans, S. (2001). Episodic memory in1029
primates. American Journal of Primatology, 55, 71–85. doi:1030
10.1002/ajp.10411031
Schwartz, B. L., Hoffman, M. L., & Evans, S. (2005).1032
Episodic-like memory in a gorilla: A review and new1033
findings. Learning and Motivation, 36, 226–244. doi:1034
10.1016/j.lmot.2005.02.0121035
Segundo-Ortin, M., & Calvo, P. (2019). Are plants cognitive?1036
a reply to adams. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science1037
Part A, 73, 64–71. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.12.0011038
Semon, R. (1921). The mneme. George Allen & Unwin.1039
Sherry, D. F., Vaccarino, A. L., Buckenham, K., & Herz,1040
R. S. (1989). The hippocampal complex of food-storing1041
birds. Brain, Behavior and Evolution, 34, 308–317. doi:1042
10.1159/0001165161043
Skov-Rackette, S. I., Miller, N. Y., & Shettleworth, S. J. (2006).1044
What-where-when memory in pigeons. Journal of Experi-1045
mental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 32, 345–358.1046
doi: 10.1037/0097-7403.32.4.3451047
Sluka, C. M., Stanko, K., Campbell, A., Cáceres, J., Panoz-1048
Brown, D., Wheeler, A., . . . Allen, C. (2018). Inciden-1049
tal spatial memory in the domestic dog (Canis familiaris).1050
Learning & Behavior, 46, 513–521. doi: 10.3758/s13420-018-1051
0327-01052
Small, S. A. (2002). The longitudinal axis of the hippocam-1053
pal formation: Its anatomy, circuitry, and role in cog-1054
nitive function. Reviews in the Neurosciences, 13. doi:1055
10.1515/revneuro.2002.13.2.1831056
Stark, S. M., Kirwan, C. B., & Stark, C. E. L. (2019). Mnemonic1057
similarity task: A tool for assessing hippocampal in-1058
tegrity. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 23, 938–951. doi:1059
10.1016/j.tics.2019.08.0031060
Stark, S. M., Yassa, M. A., Lacy, J. W., & Stark, C. E. L.1061
(2013). A task to assess behavioral pattern separation1062
(BPS) in humans: Data from healthy aging and mild cog-1063
nitive impairment. Neuropsychologia, 51, 2442–2449. doi:1064
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.12.0141065
Strange, B. A., Witter, M. P., Lein, E. S., & Moser, E. I.1066
(2014). Functional organization of the hippocampal lon-1067
gitudinal axis. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 15, 655–669.1068
doi: 10.1038/nrn3785 1069
Suddendorf, T., & Busby, J. (2003). Mental time travel in 1070
animals? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 391–396. doi: 1071
10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00187-6 1072
Suddendorf, T., & Corballis, M. C. (2007). The evolution of 1073
foresight: What is mental time travel, and is it unique to 1074
humans? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 299–313. doi: 1075
10.1017/s0140525x07001975 1076
Taiz, L., Alkon, D., Draguhn, A., Murphy, A., Blatt, M., 1077
Hawes, C., . . . Robinson, D. G. (2019). Plants neither pos- 1078
sess nor require consciousness. Trends in Plant Science, 24, 1079
677–687. doi: 10.1016/j.tplants.2019.05.008 1080
Tolman, E. C. (1939). Prediction of vicarious trial and error 1081
by means of the schematic sowbug. Psychological Review, 1082
46, 318–336. doi: 10.1037/h0057054 1083
Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psy- 1084
chological Review, 55, 189–208. doi: 10.1037/h0061626 1085
Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tul- 1086
ving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organization of memory (pp. 1087
382–402). Academic Press. 1088
Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of episodic memory. Oxford Uni- 1089
versity Press. 1090
Tulving, E. (1984). Précis of elements of episodic mem- 1091
ory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 223–238. doi: 1092
10.1017/s0140525x0004440x 1093
Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. Canadian 1094
Psychology, 26, 1–12. doi: 10.1037/h0080017 1095
Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. 1096
Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 1–25. doi: 10.1146/an- 1097
nurev.psych.53.100901.135114 1098
Tulving, E. (2005). Episodic memory and autonoesis: 1099
Uniquely human? In H. S. Terrace & J. Metcalfe (Eds.), 1100
The missing link in cognition: Origins of self-reflective con- 1101
sciousness (pp. 3–56). Oxford University Press. doi: 1102
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161564.003.0001 1103
Tulving, E. (2016). Episodic memory. In R. J. Sternberg, 1104
S. T. Fiske, & D. J. Foss (Eds.), Scientists making a differ- 1105
ence (pp. 152–155). Cambridge University Press. doi: 1106
10.1017/cbo9781316422250.034 1107
Turriziani, P., Fadda, L., Caltagirone, C., & Carlesimo, G. A. 1108
(2004). Recognition memory for single items and for asso- 1109
ciations in amnesic patients. Neuropsychologia, 42, 426–433. 1110
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2003.10.003 1111
Valenchon, M., Lévy, F., Górecka-Bruzda, A., Calandreau, L., 1112
& Lansade, L. (2013). Characterization of long-term mem- 1113
ory, resistance to extinction, and influence of temperament 1114
during two instrumental tasks in horses. Animal Cognition, 1115
16, 1001–1006. doi: 10.1007/s10071-013-0648-5 1116
Vann, S. D., Tsivilis, D., Denby, C. E., Quamme, J. R., Yoneli- 1117
nas, A. P., Aggleton, J. P., . . . Mayes, A. R. (2009). Im- 1118
paired recollection but spared familiarity in patients with 1119
extended hippocampal system damage revealed by 3 con- 1120
vergent methods. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci- 1121
ences USA, 106, 5442–5447. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0812097106 1122
Verfaellie, M., Koseff, P., & Alexander, M. (2000). Acqui- 1123
sition of novel semantic information in amnesia: effects 1124
of lesion location. Neuropsychologia, 38, 484–492. doi: 1125
10.1016/s0028-3932(99)00089-5 1126
12 CHRISTOPHER R. MADAN
Volman, S. F., Thomas C. Grubb, J., & Schuett, K. C. (1997).1127
Relative hippocampal volume in relation to food-storing1128
behavior in four species of woodpeckers. Brain, Behavior1129
and Evolution, 49, 110–120. doi: 10.1159/0001129851130
Wang, W.-C., Brashier, N. M., Wing, E. A., Marsh, E. J., &1131
Cabeza, R. (2018). Knowledge supports memory retrieval1132
through familiarity, not recollection. Neuropsychologia, 113,1133
14–21. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2018.01.0191134
Weisberg, S. M., Newcombe, N. S., & Chatterjee, A.1135
(2019). Everyday taxi drivers: Do better navigators1136
have larger hippocampi? Cortex, 115, 280–293. doi:1137
10.1016/j.cortex.2018.12.0241138
Whittlesea, B. W. A. (1993). Illusions of familiarity. Journal of1139
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition,1140
19, 1235–1253. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.19.6.12351141
Yassa, M. A., & Stark, C. E. (2011). Pattern separation in the1142
hippocampus. Trends in Neurosciences, 34, 515–525. doi:1143
10.1016/j.tins.2011.06.0061144
Yonelinas, A. P. (2001). Components of episodic memory: the1145
contribution of recollection and familiarity. Philosophical1146
Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological1147
Sciences, 356, 1363–1374. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2001.09391148
Yonelinas, A. P. (2002). The nature of recollection and famil-1149
iarity: A review of 30 years of research. Journal of Memory1150
and Language, 46, 441–517. doi: 10.1006/jmla.2002.28641151
Yonelinas, A. P., Kroll, N. E., Quamme, J. R., Lazzara, M. M.,1152
Sauvé, M.-J., Widaman, K. F., & Knight, R. T. (2002). Effects1153
of extensive temporal lobe damage or mild hypoxia on rec-1154
ollection and familiarity. Nature Neuroscience, 5, 1236–1241.1155
doi: 10.1038/nn9611156
Zentall, T. R., Clement, T. S., Bhatt, R. S., & Allen, J. (2001).1157
Episodic-like memory in pigeons. Psychonomic Bulletin &1158
Review, 8, 685–690. doi: 10.3758/bf031962041159
Zentall, T. R., Singer, R. A., & Stagner, J. P. (2008). Episodic-1160
like memory: Pigeons can report location pecked when1161
unexpectedly asked. Behavioural Processes, 79, 93–98. doi:1162
10.1016/j.beproc.2008.05.0031163
Zhou, W., & Crystal, J. D. (2009). Evidence for remembering1164
when events occurred in a rodent model of episodic mem-1165
ory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA,1166
106, 9525–9529. doi: 10.1073/pnas.09043601061167
